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Civil-militwy relations theorists have long warned against the participation oj' 
armedforces in domestic missions in democratic societies. They argue that such 
domestic roles bolster the militwy political/.\' and eventually lead to the 
overthrow oj'democratic governments. Yet for two decades now, democratic 
governments have enlisted the help oj'their militaries domestically without risk 
to the regime. Civilian leaders ojien provide the militwy 'vl'ith internal roles /0 
compensate/or the inability oj'the state to provide the puhlic and private goods 
demanded by citizens, particularly in times oj'in/ernal economic or social crisis. 
Even in the midst oj' crisis. democratic governments can withstand military 
involvement in a range oj'domestic projects, from food distribution to policing 
to provision oj' health services. This article argues that military political 
intervention that accompanies participation in internal missions is only one 
possible outcome oj'moment.l· of severe conflict induced by crisis, and will occur 
only when weak democracies with low levels oj' civilian control are victims oj' 
such crises. We examine this relationship in a comparison oj' tl1/0 Latin 
American cases' Argentina and Venezuela. 
Civil-military relations theorists have long warned against the 
participation of armed forces in domestic roles and missions in democratic 
societies. They argue that such domestic roles militarize society and politicize 
the armed forces. This suspicion is well represented in recent studies of 
democratization, and in Latin America, internal roles and missions have often 
been linked to the development of anti-regime sentiments in the officer corps, 
particularly in the cases of Chile, Argentina and Peru. 
Keeping this in mind, it is curious that twenty five years of 
democratization in Latin America have not led to an elimination of the usc of the 
armed forces in internal roles and missions. Latin America, a region with a 
particularly nasty history of military dictatorship and a relatively mature 
democratization process, would seem to be a prime candidate for the elimination 
of military domestic roles. In fact, experts writing from the region have long 
advocated such a goal, and a number of countries have considerably reduced the 
military's internal profile and imposed greater civilian supervision on their 
activities. However, even Argentina and Uruguay, who have made the greatest 
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efforts in this direction, continue to use the military for poverty alleviation and 
emergency response to natural disasters. In countries such as Honduras, Brazil 
and Venezuela, the armed forces have a developmental role, and in Bolivia and 
Colombia, the military has retained a significant mission in maintaining internal 
order. 
If the reduction of military internal roles is such a good idea, then why 
have Latin American democracies not made greater strides towards this goal? 
Some would argue that the continuing participation of the armed forces in 
domestic activities is another example of the enduring resistance of the military 
to civilian rule in Latin America. In other words, domestic military roles arc a 
sign that democracy is not consolidated and civilian control of the armed forces 
does not exist. However, there arc any number of cases in Latin America, some 
of them quite distasteful, in which military participation in domestic affairs has 
been aided, abetted and ordered by civilian leaders. For example, in 1992, 
President Alberto Fujimori of Peru ordered his armed forces to shut down other 
branches of government in what became known as an 'auto-golpe.' In 
Colombia, President Alvaro Uribe has ordered vigorous military action against 
domestic insurgents and paramilitaries, often at a pace that exceeds that desired 
by the armed forces. The latest example of a democratically elected president 
cxpanding military domestic roles in President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, who 
has introduced military personnel into almost all activities and institutions of 
government. Military domestic roles arc frequently ordcred and monitored by 
civilian leaders, not autonomous choices of the armed forces. 
In fact, the causality of the conventional wisdom, which links military 
autonomy to domestic roles and missions for the armed forces resulting in 
military intervention, is incorrect and should be reversed. Instead, in Latin 
America, civilians give the military domestic roles to compensate for state 
weakness and the deterioration of regime legitimacy. In weak states, the 
military is ordered to counteract the state's inability to provide the public and 
private goods demanded by citizens in times of internal economic or social 
crisis. Separately, in countries where democracy is weakly consolidated, civilian 
lcadcrs may attempt to use the armed forces to protect themselves from domestic 
adversaries in times of high social conflict, but then discover they are victims of 
military praetorianism. Logically, it is possible to consider a third instance in 
which relatively consolidated democracies with subordinate armed forces 
govern through weak states, leading elected leaders to use the armed forces in a 
domestic role in times of crisis with little threat to the regime since the specter 
of military intervention is checked by institutionalized civilian control. 
This paper examines the connections between domestic military roles, 
internal crises and military intervention in democratic societies. It argues that 
while state weakness induces military immersion in domestic projects, variation 
in the scope of these roles is some function of the extent of the crisis that afflicts 
a society, and the degree to which civilians have established control over the 
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armed forces. In times of severe economic, social and/or political cnS1S 
governments will more readily call upon the military to lend a hand than in non-
crisis situations. But where governments have lost authority over their armed 
forces, then the military is free to assign itself domestic missions that may best 
serve its own interests. The threat of military political intervention occurs only 
with the intersection of severe crisis and loss of civilian control. We examine 
these relationships in a comparison of two Latin American cases: Argentina and 
Venezuela. Both provide a useful range of variation across the independent 
variables at different points of their historical record, providing both cases of 
military intervention in democratic politics in moments of crisis as well as cases 
of non-intervention. 
RE-EXAMINING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: 
DOMESTIC ROLES FOR THE MILITARY IN DEMOCRACIES 
Since the third wave of democratization began in the 1970s, there has 
been a recurring argument in the literature, which states that military internal 
roles arc detrimental to democracy. In a classic article, "The New 
Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," Alfred 
Stepan (1973) argued that military preparation for and participation in internal 
roles was likely to lead to greater autonomy and a propensity to intervene in 
politics. Brian Loveman (1999) has examined historical records, constitutional 
documents, organic laws and military publications to argue that Latin American 
armed forces remain beyond the reach of civilian control and actively pursue a 
role in domestic politics and development. Even in a relatively successful case 
of civilian control, such as Argcntina during thc last dccade, J. Patrice McSherry 
(1997) argues that the Argentine military and intelligence services arc not under 
the control of elected officials. Jorge Zaverueha (1994) similarly argues that 
the internal role of the Brazilian military preeludes civilian control in that 
country. From this perspective, domestic roles for the armed forces arc an 
indicator of failure to achieve military subordination to clected authorities. 
Recent books that examine civil-military relations in well established 
democracies, such as Michael Desch's book, Civiliall Control o{ the Military 
(1999) no longer question the linkage between military internal orientation and 
poor civil-military relations. 
The core of the argument against the usc of the armed forces 
domestically centers around four hypotheses: (I) role expansion will lead to 
increased military prerogatives and autonomy from civilian oversight; (2) 
increased participation in internal roles leads to a sense of military entitlement to 
and doctrinal justification for a role in national decision-making, possibly 
leading to intervention in politics; (3) military role expansion into internal 
security is linked to increased violations of human rights, including intelligence 
activities against civilians, illegal detentions and excessive use of force; (4) 
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militaries that perform internal security roles are often poorly prepared to 
conduct external defense missions. If true, anyone of these assertions would be 
reason enough for most democratic governments to rein in the military. 
However, the linkages between domestic roles for the armed forces and 
deteriorating civil-military relations were never drawn with sufficient clarity and 
empirical depth to establish direct causality. 
In fact, recent trends raise doubts on the veracity of the four core 
arguments against internal military use. Role expansion has not led to any 
greater military autonomy in Brazil and in Argentina where presidents have 
enlisted the military's help in distributing food and health services (Pion-Berlin 
and Arceneaux, 2000). EI Salvador's success in reining in its armed forces 
following its civil war has come despite the continued employment of the 
military to address natural disasters and domcstic crime (Peceny and Stanley, 
200 I). President Uribe has been able to both strengthen ci vilian control over the 
military and increase military roles in addressing Colombia's internal conflict 
(Bruneau, 2005). These missions have been undertaken, contained and 
terminated at the behest of elected officials. Second, since the waning of classic 
national security doctrines, militaries of the region have not argued that 
domestic roles should entitle them to a seat at the national decision-making 
table. Armies that are constitutionally mandated to engage in national 
development projects certainly make no bones about their enthusiasm for such 
endeavors. But their enthusiasm stops at the water's edge of politics; they do 
not translate developmental roles into a right to make policy decisions or 
leadership choices. Third, it is true that the military's internal security missions 
sometime lead to human rights transgressions. As unfortunate as these may be, 
they do not necessarily provoke civil-military crises, or crises of governance, as 
the Colombian case makes clear. The Colombian armed forces remain 
subordinate to civilian control, and the war against the narco-guerrilla forces 
commands popular support. And fourth, militaries and governments alike are 
mindful of the tradeoffs between preparation for internal and external roles. 
Fortunately, Latin America remains a peaceful continent, one where militaries 
seldom face the prospect of armed engagement with foreign forces. Thus, the 
risks posed to reduced defense preparation are negligible. 
In recent decades, numerous scholars have cast aspersions on the core 
theses. As early as 1988, Alfred Stepan (1988) argued that what was truly 
important in a civil-military relationship is 'who decides'? Our research on 
Venezuela confirms that military involvement in domestic operations, even ones 
traditionally considered most threatening to democracy, such as 
counterinsurgency, can be conducted without risk to democracy if the operations 
of the armed forces are supervised and elected officials limit their missions, as 
occurred during much of the 1960s and 1970s (Trinkunas, 1999). While he is 
suspicious of potential consequences of internal roles for the armed forces, J. 
Samuel Fitch (2001) has argued that what is most important is how the military 
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thinks about these roles in a democracy, noting that in cases such as Ecuador, 
military ideas regarding these roles have not changed much between 
authoritarian and democratic regimes. In their article, "Decision-makers or 
Decision-takers') Military Missions and Civilian Control in Demoeratic South 
America," David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arcenaux (2000) survey over 20 recent 
domestic military operations in Latin America during the 1990s. They conclude 
that operations where duration and scope are restricted by civilian authorities 
pose little danger to democracy. 
The number of armed forces that continue to perform such internal 
roles in Latin America has remained relatively stable or grown over the last 
twenty years, yet it is not clear that democracy has been adversely affected. 
Also, a number of countries are experiencing deteriorating economic conditions 
or political instability that would have once triggered a military intervention, yet 
the armed forces continue to steer clear of any political role. The lack of any 
military reaction to the election of leftist party leader Luis Ignacio da Silva in 
Brazil is only the most striking recent example, particularly since the Brazilian 
armed forces have a large domestic role, and they always have been perceived as 
hostile to the new president's political party. All of this leads us to question 
whether the military's engagement in domestic missions leads it down a slippery 
slope toward political intervention. 
The military's use in domestic missions is related to state weakness, 
and state weakness is endemic in Latin America (Evans, 1989). As Centeno 
(2002: 112) argues, the range of functions for which the state is responsible in 
Latin Ameriea (its scope) has been historically low and remains below that of 
advanced industrialized statcs even into the present day. Adherence to neo-
liberal structural adjustment programs have made matters worse, reducing the 
state's ability to provide public goods and rents such as health services and 
education, subsidies, food assistance and employment. Within these states, 
governments are making pragmatic decisions to use the armed forces, deploying 
thcm in domestic operations where other government institutions lack the 
capacity to carry out state responsibilities. Governments that face acute and 
persistent dilemmas cannot be so principled as (0 erect a firewall of exclusion 
when it comes to military assistance. They rely on the military wherc thcy must 
and find alternatives to the military where they can. The military in tum can 
parlay these ventures into a justification for professional sustenance in the form 
of defense budget shares, salaries, and equipment. Neither armies nor 
politieians are being guided by grand visions and sweeping ideologies. What 
guides both is the notion that when push comcs to shove, some reliance on 
military deployment, infrastructure, personnel and technology may be necessary 
to solve problems when there is no other recourse. 
In the long term, democracies arc almost always better off if they can 
build civilian agencies to address social crises. In the short term, cash-strapped 
governments often lack the resources to invest in these agencies. In the context 
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of economic crises that inflict widespread hardship on their societies, the 
temptation to fall back on those organizations that have the capacity to respond 
rapidly is great. Militaries have the built-in infrastructure (bases, personnel, 
communications, transport, and logistics) that can be easily repurposed to launch 
operations to bring services and relief to imperiled communities. This can 
usually be done within pre-existing budgct lines, something fiscally-minded 
governments, under the gun to adhere to IMF spending limits, greatly 
appreciate. 
The anned forces are not the only such alternative source of assistance 
handy to civilian leaders, but given the scarcity of state resources and the 
paucity of external conflicts in the region, there would seem to be an incentive 
to use the armed forces domestically without incurring an external defensive 
risk. As Mares (2001) points out, Latin America has cxperienced relatively few 
interstate wars in the 20th century, and even militarized interstate disputes tend 
to be characterized by the employment of modest forces. Others have gone so 
far as to identify Latin America as a zone of peace in which member states do 
not regard the use of force to resolve disputes as at all likely (Kacowicz, 1998). 
While there has been relative tranquility at the borders, that has not 
been so inside many Latin American states. When domestic conflicts 
intensified, push and pull factors drew the anned forces into those disputes, 
sometimes to the detriment of democracy and civilian rule. In the past, this 
meant the military sometimes practiced political intervention - up to and 
including the toppling of civilian regimes - and the commission of widespread 
human rights abuses. Were it not for Latin America's negative historical 
experience with military intervention, many would look more kindly towards 
substantial domestic roles for the armed forces. 
DEMOCRATIZATION, CRISIS, 
AND MILITARY INTERVENTION 
When does the military intervene politically in democratic societies? 
The third wave of democratization in Latin America has not provided many 
definitive cases of failed transitions, but it has produced a handful of cases in 
which democratizing regimes facing severe social and political conflict have 
been removed or transformed with the assistance of the armed forces, including 
Peru in 1992 and Ecuador in 2000. Other regimes have survived attempted 
coups in spite of such levels of conflict (Venezuela 1992) while others have 
faced such situations with no instances of attempted military intervention 
(Argentina 2000-2002). This suggests that that democracies experience an 
uneven ability to resist military intervention in moments of crisis. 
Why is that so? This article argues that military political intervention 
that accompanies participation in internal missions is only one possible outcome 
of moments of severe conflict induced by economic or political crisis. In fact, it 
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is likely to occur only when weak democracies with low levels of civilian 
control are victims of such crises. Intervention does not occur because armies 
serve domestic roles. Rather it is the consequence of inadequate civilian control 
in the context of severe crisis that prompts the military to fill the power vacuum 
left by weakened civilians. 
Intervention is unlikely to occur when democracies are strong and 
civilian control is prcscnt, however active the military may be inside the nation's 
borders. Armies cannot easily parlay domestic roles into positions of political 
authority--even in the midst of crisis--when democratic institutions are strong 
and elected officials enjoy some semblance of civilian control. Problem solving 
abilities aside, the military do recognize the great risks to themselves to 
overturning an clected government that still commands authority and legitimacy. 
Internal division and rebellion, deep public animosity and international isolation 
are some of the costs likely to be incurred. Figure 1 illustrates this argument 
(see Figure I). 
Our hypothesis is that even in weak states, strengthened democracies 
with higher levels of civilian control over the armed forces should be able 
delimit military roles and missions in such a way as to avoid politicizing the 
ranks and provoking their intervention. In fact, state weakness should make 
military domestic roles likely, even during non-crisis periods. Such regimes 
would still probably survive economic and political crises --whether endogenous 
or provoked by external shoeks--without inviting military intervention. In weak 
states governed by poorly consolidated democracies which lack institutionalized 
civilian control over the armed forces, we should expect to see military domestic 
roles as well, but more extensive in nature. However, we argue that military 
political intrusion occurs only during moments of severe economic and social 
crisis. A country such as Honduras may experience prolonged periods of 
military quiescence even though it lacks institutionalized civilian control simply 
because domestic crises or shocks have not shaken the regime. In such cases, 
military intervention remains a possibility even after long periods of civilian 
rule. 
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In quadrant I, the military is called upon to provide security, 
developmental and/or emergency relief services at the behest of elected or 
authorized civilian political leaders. Regardless of the specific operation, the 
military remains decision-takers-not makers. Thus, even when dispatched to 
fulfill politically sensitive functions--be it rationing of food, crowd control, 
seizure of property, arrest of dissidents or drug traffickers--it acts apolitically, in 
a non-deliberative and subordinate fashion. It docs not follow that once asked to 
fulfill functions imbucd with political contcnt that thc armcd forccs turn into 
autonomous political actors. 
In quadrant II, the military-- either at the request of civilians or on its 
own accord--provides security, developmental or emergcncy relief services at a 
time of severe crisis, but because institutions of civilian control are weak or 
absent, government officials do not conduct oversight of military activities. In 
the context of government performance failures, the withdrawal of public 
support for political leaders, and societal unrest, an undeterred military can 
reverse the chain of command by filling the power vacuum left by a fatally 
weakened administration. Alternatively, civilian opponents can attempt to 
convince the military to replace a government beset by crisis. The military 
intervenes not because it had engaged in expansive domestic roles. Rather, a 
power vacuum had given it the capacity to do so, popular or elite support had 
given it a motive, and the ongoing crisis provided the opportunity. The military 
is drawn from the barracks---not the countryside-to intervene politically 
against a government seemingly paralyzed in the midst of national crisis. 
Quadrant III represents the most optimal environment, where civilians 
maintain control over the military in the absence of national crisis. Yet owing to 
state weaknesses in Latin America, there may still be a need for limited military 
involvement in domestic projects to provide public or private goods. In quadrant 
IV, state weakness also invites military role expansion. But in the absence of 
civilian oversight and authority, the military also acts autonomously, inviting 
itself to engage in domestic roles for its own institutional gain or to the 
betterment of societal allies. Here lies a latent danger. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This article focuses on the likely roles for the armed forces under 
varying political conditions in Latin America. It draws on cases from states in 
which democracy has been established for a considerable duration: Argentina 
(1983+) and Venezuela (1958+). These arc also cases in which there is 
considerable evidence in the existing literature on the weakness of their states 
and their use of the armed forces in domestic roles. Moreover, there is variation 
on the two independent variables that we have defined: civilian control of the 
armed forces and crisis. Thc historical cvidence from the two cascs should 
providc an adcquatc array of 'cascs-within-cases' with which to probe the 
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plausibility of the hypotheses presented here. We do not present a case for 
quadrant IV in figure one since many of the phenomena present in this situation 
are well studied in any number of previous analyses of civil-military relations in 
Latin America. 1 
CASE I: ARGENTINA 2001-2003 
During 2001-2003, Argentina was victim to one of the greatest crises in 
recent Latin American memory, one that generated unprecedented rates of 
unemployment, poverty, divestment, contraction, and capital flight. The crisis 
was marked by a complete breakdown in economic policymaking capacity and a 
violent social explosion that left dozens dead and brought down four presidents 
in the span of twelve days. What was the nature of the crisis, and the military's 
role in it? 
For almost a decade, the nation had persisted with a convertibility 
scheme that had kept its currency pegged to the dollar. While helping to 
dramatically lower inflation and restore economic stability, the plan also 
prevented the nation from easily adapting to the competitive environment 
generated by its MERCOSUR participation. Argentina's trade position 
deteriorated in relation to its regional partners, while falling confidence in the 
currency and persistent speculations about an impending devaluation prompted 
citizens to shift savings into dollars. A S 132 billion public sector debt was 
increasingly difficulty to pay and, for once, no bailouts from the IMF were on 
the horizon. Unemployment and poverty rose, and a once middle-class country 
saw an unprecedented 53% of its inhabitants slip below the poverty line. The 
burgeoning economic crisis led President Fernando De la Rlla to cap bank 
withdrawals in a desperate effort to save the financial system (New York Times, 
12/3/200 I). That move would precipitate his political demise. 
The economic crisis touched off massive street demonstrations 
throughout Buenos Aires and other cities. Marauding groups of "piqueteros" 
attacked the homes of several political leaders (Clarin, 12120/2001) while tens of 
thousands of angry protesters descended on the Plaza del Mayo and advanced 
toward the Casa Rosada. Taunting the police, demonstrators charged the 
Presidential palace to demand that De la Rua step down. Police held the 
protesters at bay, but on December 20th, the President had to flee by helicopter 
from the Cas a Rosada rooftop, not before tendering his resignation (Associated 
Press, 12/20/2001; Clarin, 12/20/2001) 
1 Any number of well done studies have been made of the phenomenon 
of military autonomy in civilian led regimes. During the twentieth century, these 
situations all too often erupt into crisis and military intervention. For a 
contemporary case of this phenomenon, see J. Samuel Fitch (1998) on Ecuador. 
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Protest and repression continued after De la Rua's departure, and by the 
end of that month, 28 lay dead and hundreds more wounded, in this some of the 
worst urban violence Argentina had seen in decades. Not surprisingly, the 
government had declared a state of siege in order to confront the uprisings. 
Under this constitutional provision, the government was legally entitled to call 
upon the armed forces, but during this crisis, police and internal security forces 
alone handled the confrontation. The civilian government would not resort to the 
usc of military force, and the military did as they were told: they remained in the 
barracks. This reflects thc high degree of civilian control that had been achieved 
during the previous fifteen years. 
Nor was the military involved in the settling of the nation's political 
cnSlS. De la Rua' s resignation on December 20, 2001, touched off an 
unprecedented chain of leadership turnover. By the end of the month, the 
presidency would change hands four times, before finally resting in the hands of 
Eduardo Duhalde as chief of state. If there ever was a vacuum of power at the 
apex of the political system, it was during the last 12 days of December 200 I. 
But that vacuum was filled by Argentine lawmakers who, meeting in joint 
session and operating within legal guidelines, determined how the nation's top 
post would bc filled. The Argentine democratic system had risen to the 
occasion, obviating the need for illegal and unsavory solutions. Throughout it 
all, the military remained garrisoned. Commenting on De la Rua's demise that 
triggered these unprecedented events, former army commander Martin BaIza 
said, "This was the first time a [Argentine] government is ousted without 
military intervention, without a tank in the streets" (Agence France Presse, 
1112/2002). 
However, it was Argentina's economic crisis that brought the military 
out of the barracks and into the center of an emergency eff0l1 to help suffering 
communities. In March of 2002, President Duhalde directed the armed forces to 
participate in a massive program to provide emergency food, medical, and 
sanitary relief to those zones hardest hit by the crisis. The Government 
budgeted some 350 million pesos annually for its emergency food assistance 
program----equal to six percent of total social spending (Clarin, 3/3/2002). These 
funds were distributed to provincial governments based on relative need. The 
provinces would, in turn, rely on the Catholic Church and its philanthropic 
agency, Caritas, along with other social agencies and the military, to purchase 
and distribute the relief items. 
The Argentine army seized upon this opportunity to plaee its resourees 
at the disposal of the people, perhaps to recover some of its social standing lost 
during the last two decades (La Naeion, 12/8/2002). It eonfigured its strueture, 
its territorial deployment, and its operational resources for dual use, 
collaborating in the delivery of basic neeessities to poor communities. For 
example, in the beleaguered province of Tucuman, the military offered up 163 
medics and paramedics, medicine, ambulances, mobile hospitals, sanitation 
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facilities and mobile kitchens. By August of 2002, the defense minister reported 
that the army was rationing 200,000 meals per month nationwide (Clarin, 
8/27/2002). The military has operated within civilian oversight, not displaced 
the Church and other relief agencies, nor exploited its relief role as a means of 
expanding its own power. Moreover, there is absolutely no indication that the 
military was able to expand this mission into other unauthorized areas. 
The military's involvement in the relief effort came not only at the 
orders of the civilian government but fell in compliance with existing legislation 
governing its roles inside the nation. Article 6 of the 1998 Law of Military 
Restructuring authorizes military involvement in "support of national 
communities" (Proyecto de Ley de reestructuracion, 1988). The language is 
broad enough to justify military participation in poverty alleviation programs. 
This law would seem to give the military an opening for ongoing assistance, 
since it makes no mention of crisis, defines emergencies or provides timelines. 
But the Government has sought to place geographical and temporal limits on the 
military'S involvement. President Duhalde spoke to the armed forces, stating 
that the "highest calling for a soldier is to align with the people in time of need, 
with the constitution and the law in mine£' [emphasis ours]. 2 The message was 
clear: role expansive military ventures are worthy, but must be conducted 
within the objectives and guidelines stipulated by the constitutional authorities. 
The military has so far complied, and Argentine civil-military experts agree that 
the military efforts to relieve hunger in this time of great crisis do not constitute 
a new permanent mission, nor pose any threat to civilian control.3 
CASE II: VENEZUELA 2002 
The April 2002 coup attempt against president Chavez may seem, at 
first glance, a clear example of the connection between military participation in 
domestic programs and military intervention. Certainly, one of the early changes 
in Venezuelan civil-military relations that followed Chavez's electoral victory in 
1998 was the inauguration of the Plan Bolivar 2000 that expanded military 
support to civilian communities to an unprecedented extent. However, the 2002 
coup attempt is more directly the product of both a long-term weakening of 
institutions of civilian control and the short-term explosion of a political crisis 
involving primarily civilians, not the armed forces. The expansion of military 
2 This quote can be found at the official Argentine army website. See 
Republica Argentina Sitio Oficial del Ejercito Argentino, Noticias, "el 
Presidente convoca a las fuerzas armadas para la lucha contra cl hambre," 
http://www.ejercito.mil.arlindex.ypal.htm 
3 Author's communication with two of Argentina's most respected 
experts on military affairs: Ernesto Lopez, email communication, February 10, 
2003; Jose Manuel Ugarte, email communication, February 24,2003. 
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roles that preceded the cnS1S is a reflection, rather, of state weakness and 
President Chavez's attempts to deliver public goods to his constituents. 
In the Fifth Republic (1998+), the armed forces became one of the 
principal executors of government social policy. From the beginning of his term, 
President Chavez argued that the only way to meet the current national crisis in 
Venezuela was to take advantage of the human and technical resources provided 
by the armed forces (El Universal, 2/28/1999). Furthermore, President Chavez 
explicitly called on the armed forces to join and support his revolutionary 
project (El Universal, 6/22/2000). Plan Bolivar 2000 included infrastructure 
refurbishment and construction, health care for the poor, combating illiteracy 
and unemployment, and food distribution. Hundreds of millions of dollars in aid 
was distributed through local military garrisons in each of Venezuela's 23 states. 
Local garrison commanders had wide latitude in determining the scope of 
programs, selecting suppliers and providers, and balancing their new social role 
with traditional defense requirements. What little oversight existed was 
conducted by the armed forces themselves (Trinkunas, 2002). 
While these military-led efforts at poverty alleviation and economic 
development provided significant public benefits, they came at a time when 
President Chavez was undertaking a parallel effort to replace institutionalized 
civilian control of the armed forces with direct presidential control. The 1999 
constitution, whose design was guided by President Chavez, provided the legal 
underpinnings for a sweeping expansion of military jurisdictional boundaries. 
Moreover, President Chavez became the ultimate arbiter of military promotions 
by virtue of article 236 which gives him the right to approve promotions of 
officers of the rank of colonel and general (or their naval equivalents), while at 
the same time depriving the legislature of any role in the promotion process. 
President Chavez used his direct control of the armed forces to promote 
his control over the rest of the public administration. Active duty and retired 
military officers staffed critical mid-level political and bureaucratic positions in 
the public sector, forming a military 'backbone' for government ministries. 
Retired and active duty military officers have held up to one third of the 
portfolios in the presidential cabinet, including the Ministry of Interior, Ministry 
of Infrastructure, and the governorship of the federal district during the first year 
of the Chavez administration. President Chavez was also careful to appoint 
officers who supported him in the 1992 coups to head the political and judicial 
police forces as well as the Ministry of Communications and Ministry of Interior 
(Trinkunas, 2002). 
During the first three years of the Chavez presidency, the politicization 
of the armed forces (both for and against the new regime) became increasingly 
visible in reaction to the new military policies. Junior officers began to conspire 
in small groups and distribute samizdat style anti-Chavez literature and 
videotapes. Others retired from the armed forces in protest over political 
manipulation of the officer promotion process (El Nacional, 9/14/2000). 
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Similarly, a group of retired senior military officers, known as the Institutional 
Military Front, formed for the purposed of opposing the government's usc of the 
armed forces in political and social programs but their longstanding opposition 
to Chavez himself rendered this rational suspect (El Nacional, 6/30/2000). 
Although these activities revealed the increasing stress generated within 
the officer corps by President Chavez's reforms, the active duty military seemed 
most displeased by the changes in the instruments of presidential control of the 
armed forces rather than the domestic roles per se. Civilian opposition to the 
President Chavez became especially trenchant after the administration began to 
make changes in the senior leadership of the state owned oil industry (Mommer, 
2004). The appointment of Gaston Parra, an academic highly critical of 
PDVSA, to its presidency detonated a rebellion by the middle management that 
found support in civil society at large (El Nacional, 41l6/2002). After it became 
clear that President Chavez would continue his efforts to seize political control 
of the oil industry, the civilian leaders of the opposition called for a general 
strike for 9 April 2002. Progressively larger anti-government demonstrations 
were held on successive days in Caracas, leading to a clash between the private 
sector media and the Chavez administration over news coverage of the strike. 
Tragically, a massive anti-government mareh on 11 April ended in violence 
when protesters converged on the presidential palace. Here, they clashed with 
pro-government members of the Circulos Bolivarianos and were fired upon by 
snipers. An estimated 12 persons died and over 100 were injurcd. Prcsident 
Chavez also ordered the armed forces at this time to take military control of the 
capital, an order that senior officers claim led them to begin a coup attempt (El 
Universal,4/2112002.) 
In the face of a worsening crisis, the military acted, but in reaction to a 
new internal security role rather than their Plan Bolivar 2000 role. The rebellion 
became public when the commander of the Army, General Efraim Vasquez 
Velasco, stated in a televised address surrounded by his officers that he would 
not obey presidential directives to suppress anti-govemment demonstrations and 
ordered all of his troops to remain confined to base. In his speech he 
characterized President Chavez's directives as illegal, and in short order, senior 
generals in Guardia Nacional (a militarized national police force charged with 
intemal security) and admirals in the Navy echoed his sentiments in radio and 
television broadcasts. A transitional govemment soon formed under Pedro 
Carmona, leader of the national business federation FEDECAMARAS, and it 
attempted shut down other elected and appointed branches of govemment (El 
Nacional,41l7/2002). 
General Vasquez Velasco's refusal to obey the president made it appear 
that the armed forces had turned decisively against the Chavez administration, 
yet the military rebellion never extended very far beyond the upper ranks of the 
officer corps. Although some senior officers admitted after the rebellion that 
they had been conspiring since summer 2001, they did not secure support from 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Democratization, Social Crisis and Domestic Roles 19 
officers outside Caracas (EI Nacional, 4113/2002). The military consensus in 
favor of deposing President Chavez rested on the shared conviction among 
officers that they should not be involved in repressing civilian anti-government 
demonstrators. Once the unconstitutional nature of the transitional government 
became clear with its attempts to eliminate the legislature and the judiciary, this 
consensus fell apart, allowing for a swift return of Hugo Chavez Frias to power 
on 14 April 2002 (Nuevo Pais, 411712002). 
We should underline it was President Chavez's orders to the military to 
employ violence against civilian demonstrators that precipitated the rebellion, 
rather than a reaction to military domestic relief roles. The decision by President 
Chavez to bring the armed forces into Plan Bolivar 2000 was a reaction to state 
weakness and a need to solidify political support among newly incorporated 
political actors. The later attempted use of the armed forces for internal security 
roles was another sign of the fundamental weakness of the Venezuelan state and 
democratic regime, which lacked either mechanisms to resolve a political crisis 
peacefully or the state security apparatus to maintain political order short of 
calling out a very blunt instrument, the armed forces. The military'S refusal to 
participate in internal security missions and its revolt against the president 
simply confirmed the deterioration of civilian control over the armed forces. 
CASE III: ARGENTINA 1991-2000 
The military had once been the most powerful political actor in 
Argentina, but the terrible political, economic and military failures of the 
Proceso (1976-1982) regime disgraced the armed forces. In disarray, it was in 
no position to influence the democratic governments that would follow its fall 
from grace. The military made something of a comeback during a series of 
insurrections in the latter part of the Alfonsin (1983-89) years, yet the crushing 
defeat of the final rebellion of December 1990 and the pardon of the Proceso 
junta shortly thereafter eliminate the sources of military unrest. President Carlos 
Menem (1989-1999) was able to establish an institutionalized commander in 
chief relationship with his military subordinates through the civilian-led ministry 
of defense, ensuring civilian control. 
The military no longer defined for itself what roles it would play; 
democratic government now did this. The rule of law became the order of the 
day, the political class legislated new limitations on the military's mission, and it 
codified a new hierarchical system of civilian control. Its congress passed an 
historic defense law in 1988 that defined the military'S primary mission as 
defending the nation by deterring foreign aggression. The military would be 
externally oriented, and leadership on defense issues would fall to the President 
of Argentina and his Defense Minister. The military chiefs of staff were firmly 
subordinated to the defense minister who in turn reported to the President. 
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That Defense Law and its companion, the 1992 Law of Internal 
Security, made a clear separation between systems of defense---of which the 
military was a central part-and internal security---of which the military played 
an unofficial, minor role. Internal security would be primarily the business of 
the police and security forces such as the Border Patrol (Gendarmeria) and Coast 
Guard which were removed from the Defense Ministry and placed under the 
authority of the Interior Ministry4 Article 27 of the Law of Internal security 
allowed the military to lend a hand to security forces should the government 
request it, but its assistance was confined to the logistical realm. For example, 
in 1991 President Menem created a Federal Narcotics Control Service to help 
stem the illegal transshipment of narcotics through Argentine territory. The 
agency placed the Gendarmeria at the center of these operations, but also 
employed the air force to identify clandestine airstrips through radar and aircraft 
interception. The army and navy played minor supportive roles (Huser, 2000: 
138). 
The same security law allowed the president, in exceptional 
circumstances and via a declared state of siege, to deploy the military as a 
coercive force and only as a last resort, should police and other security 
organizations be overwhelmed by some domestic insurrectionary force. While 
that specific scenario never developed during this time period, a few social 
disturbances did occur and some of these were violent. Unlike the past, the 
armed forces were never used to quell these protests, demonstrating the severe 
restriction on the military's domestic security role. The primary security 
operations were external in orientation. At the government's behest, the 
Argentine navy sent a ship to the 1991 Gulf War, and thereafter, the army 
participated a series of U.N. sponsored peacekeeping missions (Pala, 1998). By 
all accounts, these missions were professionally rewarding, and helped to instill 
within the ranks a greater respect for those civilian authorities who had made 
these missions possible. 
Internally, the military engaged in limited, non-lethal, civic action 
operations designed to help individuals and communities in need. These 
activities included flood and fire relief, housing, health, educational services, 
and infrastructure construction and repair. These operations are what we 
would expect from a democratic yet weak state, with civilian control. Unable to 
fund let alone create new civilian agencies to handle these vital tasks, politicians 
directed the military to undertake them. The army was already organized into 
regional taskforces, and equipped and trained to assist neighboring 
4 For these provisions of law, see SER en el 2000, Base de Datos, 
Argentina: White Paper on National Defense, 1998, Part V, Chapter XI, p. 4. 
http://www.ser2000.org.ar/protect/libro-argentina-eng/arg-partS.htm . 
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communities 5 If any state could least afford to do without these military 
services, it was the Argentine state under President Menem. His 
uncompromising neoliberal adjustment plan featured vast cutbacks in state 
spending along with the privatization of state-run firms. The emphasis was on 
the market, and while the private sector economy did fairly well during this 
period, the shrinking of the public sector meant a reduced capacity to address 
domestic relief and support to needy communities. 
The military provision of these public goods seldom made the 
headlines, but was vital means by which Argentina could respond to the 
recurring needs of its citizens during a period of resource scarcity. However, 
internal military missions were defined as complementary~not primary~ 
military missions. In every case, they were carried out under the auspices of the 
Defense ministry and usually in coordination with the functionally relevant 
health, social or educational state agencies. 6 We are not aware of any occasion 
on which the Argentine armed forces acted autonomously, engaged in mission 
creep, or exploited these assignments for political advantage. 
Having said that, the military brass never hid their desire to expand 
these operations, largely to justify a larger defense budget after years of 
contraction. To emphasize the importance of these missions, the army's own 
mission descriptions are infused with a developmental jargon that is sweeping, 
lofty and at times self congratulatory. 7 So far, the civilian governments have 
not conceded to the military~either in practice or in law-- a broader and more 
permanent developmental mission. Hence, under conditions of strong civilian 
control and in the absence of severe crisis, the military's domestic roles are both 
carefully circumscribed and politically unobjectionable 
5 Sce Argentina: White Paper on National Defense 1998 Part VI, 
Chapter XIV. 
6 See Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Defensa, Revision 
Defensa, 200 I, "Nuestras Fuerzas Armadas en accion, desde el EMC," p. 





7 See Republica Argentina, Sitio Oficial del Ejercito Argentino, 
"Apoyo a la Comunidad" http://www.cjcrcito.mil.ar/index_ppal.htm. 
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CONCLUSION: 
RETHINKING THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
DOMESTIC MILITARY ROLES 
Both Argentina and Venezuela are cases in which the armed forces 
developed domestic roles during periods of social crisis in response to state 
failures to provide public goods. The difference is that in Argentina, civilian 
control of the armed forces, institutionalized through a civilian-led ministry of 
defense, set limits on domestic military roles. The armed forces acted to shore 
up the state in a moment of social crisis by alleviating the most extreme 
consequences and filling in gaps in the provision of services by both the 
government and NGOs. In Venezuela, the expansion of the military role 
occurred in parallel with a dismantling of institutionalized civilian control. 
While the social relief mission of the armed forces did not per se threaten 
democracy, it did crowd out other state and NGO providers. Plan Bolivar 2000 
provided local garrison commanders considerable latitude in how they used the 
large financial resources to address local social and economic problems. 
The shortcomings in civilian oversight of the military in Venezuela 
were deepened by the constitutional and administrative reforms enacted by 
President Chavez, who preferred personal channels to administer military 
affairs. In fact, he encouraged a sense within the armed forces that they were co-
partners in the Revolution. In times of political crisis, Argentine institutions 
were sufficiently consolidated to maintain the presumption of civilian 
supremacy despite rapid changes in leadership. In Venezuela, institutional 
channels for civilian oversight no longer existed, and military autonomy grew 
apace. When an internal political crisis erupted in April 2002 and the Revolution 
called on them to carry out distasteful internal security actions, senior military 
commanders preferred to abandon their partnership with the regime, and 
disregarding their constitutionally subordinate role, rebelled. 
Although President Menem in Argentina also built personal 
relationships with senior military commanders during the 1990s, a civilian-led 
Ministry of Defense continued to administer and oversee military affairs on a 
day-to-day basis, slowly consolidating the rules and standard operating 
procedures that guide Argentine civil-military relations. Turbulent leadership 
changes within the political leadership of the state were not reflected in the 
management of the armed forces. The Ministry of Defense civilian bureaucracy 
continued to monitor military activities, and the armed forces acted within the 
boundaries set by their expanded missions. In other words, role expansion did 
not encourage increased military autonomy or a protagonistic role for the armed 
forces in Argentine politics in 2001. 
Events in Argentina and Venezuela in 2001 and 2002 remind us of the 
continuing shortcomings of state institutions in Latin America and the latent 
(and sometimes overt) social and economic tensions that fuel periodic political 
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crises in the region. It is difficult to imagine that democratic leaderships, no 
matter how suspicious of military designs, will willingly abstain from using the 
armed forces and their capabilities to address domestic crises. What the 
comparison of Argentina and Venezuela confirms is the key role of 
institutionalized civilian control in sustaining democratic regimes during these 
moments, preventing the growth in military autonomy and protagon ism that has 
historically provoked regime change in times of crisis. 
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